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Article 10

THE POLITICS OF
UNFEELING
Joe Rollins
Affect and American Literature in
the Age of Neoliberalism by Rachel
Greenwald Smith. New York:
Cambridge University Press,
2015. 194 pp. Hardback: $102.00

In the years since the 2011 occupation of Wall Street by anticonsumerist activists, a palpable sense of
positivity has saturated left-wing
politics. This tenor has shaped
a variety of contemporary progressive campaigns, from Jeremy
Corbyn’s “politics of hope” and
Bernie Sanders’s invigorating push
for the Democratic Party nomination to the work of the popular
antifascist organization HOPE not
Hate. Against this cultural backdrop, however, there remain those
critics of literature and visual arts
who maintain an interest in the
progressive political possibilities
inherent in less palatable branches
of affective experience: feeling bad,
feeling nothing, or feeling something indefinable but recognizably
unsettling. In 2015, three publications looked to the possibilities
that artworks generative of typically “negative” affects might have
for producing political change.
Hal Foster’s republished essay
“Abjection” in his book Bad New
Days, Nikolaj Lubecker’s study
The Feel-Bad Film, and the topic
of this review, Rachel Greenwald
Smith’s monograph Affect and
American Literature in the Age of
Neoliberalism all consider the role
that traditionally “negative” affect
might play in reconfiguring and
resisting the hegemonic experience
of neoliberal subjectivity.
In Affect and American Literature
in the Age of Neoliberalism, Smith
sets out to challenge what she terms
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“the affective hypothesis,” defined
as “the belief that literature is at its
most meaningful when it represents
and transmits the emotional specificity of personal experience” (1). In
the context of neoliberalism, Smith
argues, this hypothesis has been
transfigured into a contract between
author and reader, wherein the latter demands of the former a tangible affective payout in return for
a temporary emotional investment.
This payout comes in the form of
“personal feelings,” which are private and recognizable and can be
networked for further individual
gain. For Smith, this formulation
is strictly compatible with the neoliberal injunction to draw all forms
of human behavior under the ambit
of the market. In short, for Smith,
reading has become transactional.
Against these personal feelings and
the contract model of reading on
which they depend, Smith offers an
alternative in the form of “impersonal feelings.” These are feelings
that are unpredictable and difficult
to codify, and works that generate them are frequently labeled as
“cerebral” or “cold.” Drawing on
key theorists of affect including
Deleuze and Massumi, Smith sets
out to describe how impersonal feelings generated by works of “cold”
literature can catalyze “attitudinal
states that suggest alternatives to the
apparent permanence of the neoliberal status quo” (29).
Smith structures her book
around a series of close readings

organized into four thematically
arranged chapters. Smith’s case
studies are acknowledged by the
author herself to be a mixed cohort
with few generic or generational
affinities but are instead grouped
by their shared experimentalism.
In each chapter, she presents two of
these case studies in tandem, with
one example representing complicity with the affective hypothesis
and one successfully challenging it:
Paul Auster generates impersonal
feelings, while Cormac McCarthy
generates personal ones; Jonathan
Safran Foer narrates the events of
September 11 from a perspective
complicit with neoliberal hegemony, while Laird Hunt manages to draw attention to the “deep
entanglement” occluded by narratives such as Foer’s; Dave Eggers
generates a false sense of agency
contiguous with neoliberal subjectivity, while Ben Marcus curtails
and subverts this same illusion of
autonomy; and Lydia Millet fails
where Richard Powers succeeds to
write an ecological narrative that
neither domesticates wildness nor
fails entirely to accommodate noncapitalist life in literary representation. Several theses thread through
these chapters: a wariness of
manipulative sentiment and overt
appeals to empathy; a celebration of
feelings that resist easy codification
(such as unease or “metafeeling”);
an attendant resistance to illusions
of agency, control, and systemic
representation; and an interest in
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alternative systems for the circulation of both affects and the literary objects that generate them,
most arrestingly in the form of the
ecosystem.
In Smith’s first chapter, she
pits Cormac McCarthy’s The
Road against Paul Auster’s Book
of Illusions, arguing that the emotional economy of McCarthy’s stark
novel reflects the neoliberal belief
that “extra-economic activities obey
the same logic as market activities”
(45). Auster’s book, contrastingly,
focuses its efforts on metafeelings—feelings about feeling—
which lend a cerebral detachedness
to a narrative that one would ordinarily expect to be highly melodramatic. Circumventing this
emotional economy allows Auster
to stage a resistance to neoliberal
logic, whereas McCarthy becomes
complicit. This is a cogently argued
and forceful start to the book, and
Smith admirably blends insightful
close readings with dexterous theoretical work as she analyzes the two
novels. The chapter also ends with
an important disclaimer for those
readers coming to Smith’s work
looking for a blueprint for how literature might stage a practical resistance to neoliberal policy. Smith
qualifies that impersonal artworks
are not explicitly critical of neoliberalism; rather, the way they operate “complicates the fundamental
expectations of neoliberalism by
placing a focus on aspects of life
that fall outside its structures” (59).
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That is, they disregard personal
investment and return, they depersonalize and deindividualize, and
they break their “contracts” and are
thus not easily incorporated into a
market model of reading and consumption. The question is never
whether a work is pro- or antineoliberal but rather whether it is complicit in allowing neoliberal values
to go unchallenged. Auster’s work,
therefore, is not antineoliberal; it
is just not neoliberal. Whether this
is good enough for Smith’s readers, I suspect, will depend on their
preexisting position vis-à-vis the
relationship between politics and
aesthetics.
Smith’s chapters skip along at a
brisk pace, and the snappy, mostly
dejargoned prose is pleasurable to
read—a slightly ironic observation given the object of Smith’s
critique. Such neatness is less palatable when it comes to the structure of the book, however. The
“good book versus bad book” template that Smith adheres to for the
duration of the study occasionally
feels needlessly schematic, and her
inflexibility leads to some stretched
close readings and moments of
tenuous critical insight. The second, arguably weakest, chapter
of the book is a good example of
this problem. Focusing on the literature of September 11, Smith
arrays Jonathan Safran Foer’s
Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close
against Laird Hunt’s The Exquisite.
Representing September 11 is
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highly problematic, Smith suggests,
because “doing so tends to either
exceptionalize U.S. deaths or testify to the rupturing force of the
event, either of which simply reinforces dominant political positions”
(70). It is into this pitfall that Smith
sees Foer falling, his narrative
privileging the event to a degree
that supports its neoliberal instrumentalization. In contrast, Hunt
challenges this dominant representation precisely by not representing September 11 in his novel set
in New York in September 2001.
Added to this formal elision, Smith
reads an exchange between two
characters concerning the herringfishing industry as a broken metaphor for the event—purposefully
broken, that is, to signify the “missing element” in conventional representations of September 11. This
is a plausible—if shaky—reading;
but Smith stops here, and I found
myself wanting a more thorough
analysis of Hunt’s novel in support
of Smith’s thesis. The rigid structure of “good” versus “bad” book
relies on deep and nuanced critical analysis, and here and in other
places in the book Smith sacrifices
this depth, I suspect, in favor of
maintaining the neatness of her
structure.
Smith’s unwillingness to apply
pressure to the structure of her
book also leads to some critical
gaps in her account of affect. At
the book’s most fundamental level,
Affect and American Literature is an

argument against overt empathy.
But Smith offers little concession
to the productiveness of empathy
or to other equally codifiable, but
no less potentially valuable, affects.
Where, for example, is the discussion of feminist authors such as
Kathy Acker, whose own experimental literature is grounded in
a palpable state of rage, or Chris
Kraus, whose novel I Love Dick
reflects the author’s highly successful attempt to make the political personal? Likewise, while the
sort of affects Smith champions
have their defenders, the affective
hypothesis she rejects has also itself
been harnessed to a position of antineoliberalism in, for example, the
work of critics such as Adam Kelly,
whose focus on the group of authors
associated with the New Sincerity
movement demonstrates the resistant potential of novels that elicit a
faith-based contractual agreement
from their readers.1 Smith’s book
would have perhaps benefited
from sacrificing some of the neatness of her structure in favor of a
somewhat looser framework more
capable of accommodating these
alternative ideas.
If the second chapter of Smith’s
work is arguably its weakest, Affect
and American Literature more than
makes up for early shortcomings
in its later chapters. For the book’s
final case study, Smith looks to the
genre of environmental writing. As
with September 11 novels, Smith
suggests that writers tackling the
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topic of ecology face a challenge: a
paradoxical state whereby, on the
one hand, an attempt to place an
ecosystem into a human narrative
risks domesticating the wild’s wildness and thus the very thing that
freights it with resistant potential
and, on the other, failing to assimilate the ecosystem at all leads to a
capitulation to the impossibility of
representing nonhuman, noncapitalist experience in literature. For
Smith, Lydia Millet’s novel How
the Dead Dream fails to resolve
this paradox, its inability to subordinate the human narrative at
the center of the novel leading
to a resolution in which the text
seems to conclude that “story and
ecological consciousness . . . are, at
root, incompatible” (104). Richard
Powers’s The Echo Maker, on the
other hand, successfully balances a
human narrative with a nonhuman
one, ceding certain perspectives to
nonhuman actors and mirroring
an alternative form for the novel in
which linear progression is sublimated under an erratic and unpredictable ecology of effects and
affects. Smith convincingly argues
that in Powers’s novel, as in Karen
Tei Yamashita’s Tropic of Orange,
which Smith briefly analyzes in her
introduction to Affect and American
Literature, a literary form modeled on the ecological offers real
possibilities to “catalyz[e] unlikely
changes in readers, and provok[e]
physical responses with unpredictable results” (124). These effects are
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loosely conceived—perhaps understandably so given that Smith is trying to work with affects that are by
their nature uncodifiable; but the
story she tells here and throughout Affect and American Literature
provides a convincing foundation
for future study, and I do not doubt
that it will prove an influential and
widely cited text in years to come.
Yet Smith’s work also brings up
larger questions about how we, as
critics, are to engage with neoliberalism. At the end of her third chapter, Smith places Bruno Latour
in opposition to Fredric Jameson
and his famous concept of cognitive mapping. Smith problematizes
Jameson’s vision of an art capable
of cognitively mapping a reader’s
place in the global capitalist system by drawing attention to this
theory’s congruences with a neoliberal belief in an unfettered personal
agency that is in actuality illusive.
Complexity means any cognitive
map will be necessarily imperfect,
and so the illusion of agency that
such mapping confers can, for
Smith, only be damaging. To support her argument, Smith deploys
Latour’s critique of artworks that
attempt to “trace” network connections. For Latour, any such
endeavor will naturally be reductive and generative of a false sense
of autonomy. What is far more radically potent, for both Smith and
Latour, is for artworks to shatter
these false illusions of autonomy on
which so many of neoliberalism’s
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claims rest. This, for Smith, is the
ultimate power of “impersonal
feelings.” These feelings resist mastery and control, frustrate attempts
at self-location, and force a confrontation with our limitations as
actors embedded within a complex
system. Only from the perspective
of recognition can complicity then
be rejected and challenge mounted.
Here Smith’s broader claims
become problematic. Smith’s vision
of an individual agent’s limited
knowledge of the complex economic system sounds surprisingly
reminiscent of Friedrich Hayek’s
knowledge problem, with which
the economist justified his vision of
a neoliberal free market. To submit,
as Smith does, to this neoliberalendorsed concept of the market as
an unfathomably complex system
seems, to me, somewhat defeatist.
Likewise, to reject positive affect
in favor of coldness and cerebrality feels at times like a form of surrender and prompts the question,
might we not wish to claim back
affect from neoliberalism, rather
than allow it to be taken? In a discussion of the concept of self-care
as a neoliberal conspiracy, Sara
Ahmed notes that “neoliberalism sweeps up too much when all
forms of self-care become symptoms of neoliberalism.” In the same
discussion, she remarks that “talking about personal feelings is not
necessarily about deflecting attention from structures.”2 Ahmed’s

point is that allowing neoliberalism
to infect something as potentially
generative as self-care or affect, and
to operate as if this is an intractable
truth, is to ultimately become complicit in that project.
Smith’s book, then, is vital reading for its inventive exploration of
neoliberalism as a formal problem
but even more so as an entry point
into the problem of the very possibility of critique under neoliberalism. Smith’s monograph begs
the question, is the critical work
of the future about recognition or
reclamation? Further scholarly
work will be necessary to answer
this question, but that work will
undoubtedly owe a great debt to
the rigorous and engaging foundation that Smith has built with Affect
and American Literature in the Age
of Neoliberalism.
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1989–2001.
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